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This paper investigates the relationship between media bias and the influence of the media on voting
in the context of newspaper endorsements. We first develop a simple econometric model in which
voters choose candidates under uncertainty and rely on endorsements from better informed sources.
Newspapers are potentially biased in favor of one of the candidates and voters thus rationally account
for the credibility of any endorsements. Our primary empirical finding is that endorsements are influential
in the sense that voters are more likely to support the recommended candidate after publication of
the endorsement. The degree of this influence, however, depends upon the credibility of the endorsement.
In this way, endorsements for the Democratic candidate from left-leaning newspapers are less influential
than are endorsements from neutral or right-leaning newspapers, and likewise for endorsements for
the Republican. These findings suggest that voters do rely on the media for information during campaigns
but that the extent of this reliance depends upon the degree and direction of any bias.
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Voters are often uncertain as to which candidate to support when going to the polling booth
and may thus attempt to gather information regarding candidates from better informed
sources. One important potential source for such information is the media, which has tra-
ditionally been viewed a key ingredient in the development of a well-functioning democracy.
While this potential role for the media in providing information to voters is widely recog-
nized, there is also signi￿cant concern among voters and political commentators alike that
such information may not be su￿ciently objective. According to recent survey data, over
one-half of voters perceive that the media is politically biased in its reporting, and these per-
ceptions of media bias have increased over time (Pew, 2005). If voters are unsophisticated
and do not adequately account for any political bias in information provided by the media,
then left-leaning media sources may systematically improve electoral outcomes for Demo-
cratic candidates and likewise for right-leaning media sources and Republican candidates.
In this case, media bias may lead to poor decisions by voters in terms of selecting relatively
low-quality candidates for o￿ce.
A key question regarding the role of media in democracies is then whether voters are
su￿ciently sophisticated to ￿lter out any media bias and, correspondingly, to reduce their
reliance on biased reporting when choosing between political candidates in elections. Survey
questions regarding trust in the media suggest that voters do attempt to ￿lter out media bias.
In particular, according to recent survey data, over 40 percent of respondents report that
they have \hardly any con￿dence in the media", as opposed to \a great deal of con￿dence"
or \some con￿dence" in the media. Moreover, the fraction of voters lacking con￿dence in
the media has more than doubled over the past three decades, mirroring the recent upward
trend in voter perceptions of media bias (Pew, 2005).
These relatively low levels of media credibility are certainly suggestive that voters do
attempt to ￿lter out media bias. Yet there is little direct evidence that any reduced reliance
on biased media reports is re￿ected in voting decisions, the ultimate political outcome. Does
biased coverage have less in￿uence over voters than unbiased coverage? In this paper, we
investigate these issues in the context of the role of newspaper endorsements in voting deci-
sions. We begin by developing a simple econometric model in which voters have incomplete
information over candidate quality and thus look to the media for guidance. Newspapers
1have better information than do voters but are potentially biased and may thus endorse
candidates of relatively low quality if the bias is severe. Voters are rational and, when eval-
uating endorsements, attempt to ￿lter out any such bias on the part of the media. The key
insight of the model is that, if voters do ￿lter out media bias, then endorsements for the
Democratic candidate, say, from a left-leaning newspaper are less credible and should thus
have less in￿uence than a similar endorsement from a neutral or a right-leaning source.
We then test this prediction regarding media bias and the in￿uence of the media on vot-
ing using information from daily survey data, which includes individual-level data on voting
intentions as well as newspaper readership, in the months leading up to the 2000 and 2004
Presidential elections. These data are combined with newspaper-level endorsement informa-
tion, which includes not only the name of the endorsed candidate but also the endorsement
date, which facilitates a comparison of voter intentions and preferences after the endorsement
to those of similar readers before the endorsement. Our measures of endorsement credibil-
ity are derived from a statistical model, which allows us to infer the ideological leanings of
each newspaper as a function of its characteristics, which includes information on newspa-
per ownership as well as information regarding reader preferences over candidates prior to
the publication of endorsements. Using these derived credibility measures, we show that
endorsements are in￿uential in the sense that readers are more likely to support the favored
candidate after publication of the endorsement. Importantly, however, the credibility of the
endorsement is the most important determinant of its in￿uence. In particular, we show that
in￿uence is increasing in the credibility of the endorsement and that endorsements from ex-
tremely biased newspapers have little or no in￿uence. Encouragingly, these baseline results
are robust to several alternative speci￿cations. Taken together, these results suggest that
voters do attempt to learn from the media when choosing between candidates in elections
but, at the same time, discount information from sources that are perceived to be politically
biased.
The paper proceeds as follows. We next review the relevant literature on sources and
measurement of media bias and the in￿uence of the media on voting. We then develop an
econometric model of voter learning from newspaper endorsements. After describing the data
used in our empirical application, we provide details on the empirical implementation of the
econometric model and describe the baseline empirical results and the robustness checks.
The ￿nal section of the paper concludes.
22 Related Literature
This paper is related to a large literature on the political economy of the media sector. Given
the size of this literature, we focus here on its two most relevant branches: the sources and
measurement of media bias and the in￿uence of the media on voting decisions.
2.1 Sources and Measures of Media Bias
The theoretical literature in this area has focused primarily on the institutional determi-
nants of media bias. According to the demand-side view, media outlets are primarily driven
by pro￿t motives, as opposed to political motives. In this case, bias may arise from the
preferences of consumers of the media. Under the assumption that consumers prefer to con-
sume news that con￿rms their prior beliefs, competition forces newspapers to di￿erentiate
themselves by moving to the ideological extremes (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005). Even if
consumers prefer media outlets that deliver unbiased information, however, bias may emerge
if readers use such reports to evaluate the quality of the information source. In this case,
readers believe that outlets have better information if the reports conform to the prior beliefs
of the reader (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006). A related idea is that, due to the increasing-
return-to-scale technology and their dependence on advertising revenue, media outlets may
deliver more news to large groups and groups that are valuable to advertisers (Stromberg,
2004).
In addition to demand-side factors as a potential source, media bias may also re￿ect the
preferences and career concerns of journalists (Baron, 2006), editors, or owners (Djankov et
al., 2003). If the media plays a role in monitoring the behavior of incumbents, it is possible
that government capture of the media sector may lead to distortions in news coverage (Besley
and Prat, 2006). Puglisi (2006), Snyder and Stromberg (2008), Larcinese, Puglisi, and Snyder
(2007) provide empirical support for this view of the media as a watchdog over the actions
of incumbent politicians.
The literature has also made recent strides in terms of measuring the ideological orienta-
tion of di￿erent media outlets. Groseclose and Milyo (2005) provide a method for measuring
media bias in the news stories of several major media outlets in the U.S. They arrive at
their measure by counting the citations of think tanks in the media and then comparing
3the citations of think tanks by Republicans or Democrats in Congress. They ￿nd that, on
average, outlets tend to be biased towards to the left. In a paper providing empirical support
for the demand-side view of media bias, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2007) construct an index of
media slant by comparing the language in newspapers to the language used by politicians in
Congress. Their results suggest that newspaper slant is similar to the position that would
be chosen by a pro￿t-maximizing ￿rm.
There is relatively little research into the political determinants of newspaper endorse-
ments. The exceptions to this pattern include Ansolabehere et. al. (2006), who examine
newspaper endorsements between 1940 and 2002. They document a trend away from strongly
favoring Republicans in the early years of the sample towards favoring Democrats today.
They also ￿nd that newspapers are much more likely to endorse incumbents today than
in the past. Also, Kim (2008) provides evidence that newspaper endorsements are largely
driven by owner preferences, rather than reader preferences.
2.2 Media In￿uence
Theoretically, the media may have persuasive e￿ects, con￿rmative e￿ects, or no e￿ects on
political behavior. According to Bray and Kreps (1987), on average, voters can ￿lter out
bias without being persuaded if voters are fully rational and media reports are continuous.
On the other hand, if reports are binary, or \coarse", media reports may in￿uence even fully
rational voters; see, for example, Baron (2006). In addition, if voters are not fully rational,
media may have persuasive e￿ects on voting behavior (De Marzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel,
2003).
The primary empirical challenge to detecting a causal media in￿uence is the tendency
for consumers to choose news outlets that share similar political perspectives. Several recent
studies have made e￿orts in di￿erent ways to deal with this potential selection bias. Kaplan
and Della Vigna (2007) identi￿ed the e￿ect of Fox News on voting behavior by looking at
the introduction of Fox News Channel in a town-level analysis. They found that Fox News
convinced 3 to 28 percent of its viewers to vote Republican. Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan
(2008) conducted a ￿eld experiment and found that subscriptions to the Washington Post
increased the probability of voting for the Democratic candidate by eight percentage points in
the 2005 Virginia gubernatorial election. Other studies have documented an e￿ect of media
4exposure on voter turnout, including George and Waldfogel (2006) and Gentzkow (2006).
In terms of studies focusing on the impact of newspaper endorsements, Erikson (1976),
using county-level data, ￿nds that newspaper endorsements in the 1964 presidential elections
increased the vote share of the endorsed candidate by ￿ve percentage points. Kahn and
Kenney (2002) found signi￿cant positive e￿ects of endorsements in U.S. Senate races on
the comparative feeling thermometer score in National Election Survey data. Similarly,
Druckman and Parkin (2005) ￿nd that endorsements have an e￿ect on voting by using
information from exit polls. Ladd and Lenz (2008) use changes in newspaper endorsements
between the 1992 and 1997 elections in the United Kingdom and report that the persuasive
e￿ects of endorsements are large.
This paper contributes in several ways to this empirical literature on the in￿uence of the
media. First, we provide theoretical foundations for measuring the in￿uence of the media on
voting. Second, we attempt to address the tendency of consumers to access like-minded media
outlets by collecting information on the endorsement date, which permits a pre-endorsement
and post-endorsement comparison. Finally, as far as we are aware, our paper provides the
￿rst test of the idea that the in￿uence of an endorsement should depend on its bias and its
associated credibility.
3 An Econometric Model of Voting and Endorsements
In this section, we derive a simple econometric model of voter learning from newspaper
endorsements. Given our empirical motivations, we keep the model simple and employ
speci￿c functional forms and distributional assumptions where necessary. It should be clear,
however, that the basic logic of the model is robust to alternative modeling assumptions and
does not rely on these speci￿c functional forms.
The model consists of two candidates (c 2 fD,Rg) competing for election, a set of voters,
indexed by v, and a set of newspapers, indexed by n. Candidates can be characterized
by both their ideology (iD;iR) as well as their quality (qD;qR): Without loss of generality,
we assume that ideology increases as candidate positions move further to the right; that is
iD < iR. Voters can also be characterized by their ideology (iv), and, all else equal, prefer
to elect the candidate with ideology closest to their own. Candidate quality, by contrast,
is a characteristic that is valued by all voters and can be interpreted in a variety of ways,
5including political experience, integrity, or competence as an executive. More formally, we
assume that voter v receives the following payo￿ from candidate c winning the election:
Uvc = qc ￿
!
2
(iv ￿ ic)2 (1)
where ! represents the utility weight placed upon candidate ideology.
Regarding the information structure, we assume that voters know the ideological positions
of the candidates but are uncertain over relative candidate quality, which is de￿ned by
q = qD ￿ qR . In particular, we assume that initial priors over relative quality are normally
distributed with mean ￿, which we normalize to zero, and a variance ￿2
q. Voters support the
candidate who maximizes their expected utility.
Voters are assumed to read a single newspaper and potentially observe an endorsement
from newspaper n for either the Democrat (en = 1) or for the Republican (en = 0): Be-
fore observing an endorsement, voter v supports the Democrat if his ideology is below the
midpoint of the ideologies of the two candidates:




After observing an endorsement, voter v supports the Democrat if his ideology is below a
quality-adjusted threshold :







Thus, if voters update positively with regard to the relative quality of the Democrat, then the
ideological threshold for supporting the Democrat is increased, or moves further to the right.
By contrast, if voters update negatively with regard to the relative quality of the Democrat,
then the ideological threshold for supporting the Democrat is decreased, or moves further to
the left. In order to understand how voters update over quality following endorsements, as
represented by E(qjen), we next present a framework for newspaper endorsements.
During the campaign, newspapers receive information regarding candidate quality and
make endorsements based on this information as well as their own ideological positions. In
particular, newspapers are assumed to receive an unbiased signal over relative candidate
quality:
￿n = q + "n: (4)
6where "n is the noise in the signal and is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero
and variance ￿2
": Rather than formally modelling the objectives and endorsement decisions
of newspapers, we simply assume that each newspaper is associated with an exogenously











Thus, newspapers with higher values of pn lean further to the right and thus have a higher
threshold for endorsing the Democratic candidate. We assume that voters know the editorial
position of the newspaper (pn) as well as the quality of the newspaper’s information (￿2
"):
Returning to voter behavior, we can now evaluate how individuals attempt to infer quality
from newspaper endorsements. As seen above, this inference is potentially complicated by
the ideological position of newspapers. In addition, while the underlying information is
continuous, the media report is discrete, and thus voters only learn that the information was
above or below some newspaper-speci￿c threshold.1 Accounting for any political bias by
newspapers and the discrete nature of the endorsement, voters update over quality following
an endorsement for the Democratic candidate as follows:














" represents the voter’s updating coe￿cient and is increasing in the
degree of initial uncertainty (￿2
q) but is decreasing in the degree of noise in the signal (￿2
"):
Finally, ￿d represents the credibility of an endorsement for the Democrat from newspaper n





and ￿ and ￿ are the Normal density and distribution function, respectively. Given that ￿d
is monotonically increasing in pn, we can say that, due to voter ￿ltering of media bias, an
endorsement for the Democrat, say, from a left-leaning newspaper, such as the New York
Times, provides less information to voters than does an endorsement from a right-leaning
1 A similar issue arises in Grossman and Helpman (1999), who focus on endorsements by interest groups,
rather than media sources.
7newspaper, such as the Washington Times.2
Voters update in an analogous manner upon observing a Republican endorsement:














Similarly to the discussion of the credibility of Democratic endorsements, the credibility of
Republican endorsements is decreasing in the degree of a newspaper’s leaning to the right
and such an endorsement from a left-leaning source provides more information to voters than
does an endorsement from a right-leaning source.
Although we have taken editorial positions (pn) as exogenous here, in Appendix 1 we
explore two models with endogenous editorial positions, both of which follow the theoretical
literature on media bias. In a demand-side model, a monopoly newspaper attempts to
maximize pro￿ts, and the value of information to a representative consumer depends upon
the editorial position. In this case, the newspaper optimally slants its coverage towards reader
preferences. In a supply-side model, by contrast, newspapers have ideological preferences and
attempt to increase the electoral prospects of their preferred party. In this case, editorial
positions re￿ect owner preferences.
4 Data
In order to estimate the in￿uence of newspaper endorsements, we use voter reactions to en-
dorsements as captured in daily survey data, which are provided by the National Annenberg
Election Surveys 2000 and 2004. This survey employs a rolling cross-section design in which
hundreds of voters were polled on a daily basis in the months leading up to the election.
For the purposes of our analysis, we use information from these data on voting intention,
voting decision, favorability of candidates and the newspaper read most often. The vote
intention question regarding the choice between Gore and Bush for 2000 presidential election
was asked between December 14, 1999 and election day. The exact wording is the following:
\Thinking about the general election for president and candidates were George W. Bush, the
2 For the result regarding the monotonicity of the Mills ratio, see Heckman (1979).
8Republican, and Al Gore, the Democrat, who would you vote for?" Respondents may choose
to answer \Republican, Democrat, other, would not vote for president, or don’t know". After
election day, respondents were asked which candidate they voted for if voted.3 The wording
in the 2004 survey is similar to that in 2000, although voters may also choose to vote for
Nader.
Information regarding the dates of newspaper endorsements and endorsed candidates is
derived from several di￿erent sources, including the website Democracy in Action and various
newspaper archives (Lexis-Nexis, Factiva, and the Associated Press).4 As shown in Figure
1, there is substantial variation in the timing of newspaper endorsements. Most newspapers
published their endorsements in the editorial pages during the weekend. While many news-
papers made endorsements in the weekend just before the election, some newspapers made
their intentions known earlier.
In order to estimate newspaper editorial positions, which are unobserved by the econome-
trician, we rely on information on newspaper ownership and political preferences of readers.
Kim (2008) provided data on group ownership. Readers’ preference is based on vote intention
of newspaper readers prior to the publication of endorsements. As a robustness check, we
also use preferences of residents in the newspaper market to measure preferences of potential
readers, where newspaper markets are de￿ned as the area in which most of its readers reside.
Small newspapers, de￿ned as those with less than ten readers in the data, and newspapers
that did not make an endorsement are excluded from the sample. After dropping these
observations, we have 166 newspapers in 2000, 212 newspapers in 2004, and 32,014 individuals
in the sample, of which twelve percent were surveyed after publication of the endorsement.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1.
5 Empirical Application
5.1 Econometric implementation
3 Given that the data do not have precise information on the timing of voting among early voters, we do
not know whether or not the vote choice was made before or after the endorsement. Given this limitation,
we thus exclude early voters from the sample.
4 The Democracy in Action webiste of newspaper is available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~action/natendorse5.html.
9To further develop the econometric model, we assume that voter ideology can be written as
a function of observed voter characteristics (Xv), which includes a constant term, a set of
￿xed e￿ects and unobserved characteristics:
iv = ￿Xv + ￿t + ￿n + ￿vt (10)
where ￿ is a vector of parameters to be estimated, ￿t is a time ￿xed e￿ect, ￿n is a newspaper
￿xed e￿ect, and ￿vt is unobserved by the econometrician. For tractability, we assume that
￿vt is uniformly distributed, which leads to the linear probability model. In addition, we
assume that newspaper editorial positions can be expressed as a function of newspaper
characteristics:
pn = ￿Zn (11)
Using these parameterizations, we can summarize the two{equation model as follows:
Pr(endorse D) = 1 ￿ ￿(￿Zn) (12)
Pr(vote D) = ￿Afternt[en￿d(￿Zn) ￿ (1 ￿ en)￿r(￿Zn)] ￿ ￿Xv ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿n (13)
where Afternt is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the endorsement by newspaper
n had been published by date t. Note that the voting equation depends upon the vector of
parameters from the endorsement equation (￿), which is unobserved by the econometrician,
and we thus estimate the model in two stages. In the ￿rst-stage, we estimate a Probit
model in which newspaper endorsement decisions are related to newspaper characteristics
(Zn). With the estimated parameters (b ￿) from this ￿rst stage, we can then compute the
Mills ratios ￿d(b ￿Zn) and ￿r(b ￿Zn), which we use in the second-stage voting equation. Given
that this second stage includes a generated regressor, we compute the standard errors using
bootstrapping techniques.5
5.2 Baseline Results
Table 2A reports results from estimation of the ￿rst-stage endorsement equation. Following
the literature on media bias and the discussion of editorial positions in Appendix 1, we in-
clude the preferences of owners as a supply-side measure as well as the preferences of readers
5 In particular, we draw samples with replacement from the underlying set of newspapers and also inde-
pendently draw samples with replacement from the underlying set of voters. The standard errors are based
upon 200 replications.
10as a demand-side measure. To avoid potential endogeneity problems, we use the fraction of
readers supporting the Democrat prior to the publication of the endorsement. As shown,
the preferences of readers has a strong and statistically signi￿cant e￿ect on newspaper en-
dorsement decisions. To capture the preferences of owners, we include dummy variables for
group-owned newspapers.6 As shown, newspapers that are owned by Cox Newspapers,
Gannett, Knight Ridder, McClatchy Newspapers, and the New York Times Company are
more likely to endorse Democratic candidates. These results are consistent with Kim (2008),
who shows that four out of ￿ve of these groups tend to contribute more to Democratic can-
didates than to Republican candidates. The results also demonstrate that newspapers were
more likely to endorse the Democrat during the 2004 campaign, relative to 2000 campaign.
Using these coe￿cients, we can then compute the predicted probability of an endorse-
ment for either the Democrat or the Republican, and these predicted probabilities are then
converted into credibility measures. As shown in Table 3, there is signi￿cant variation in
the predicted probability of an endorsement for the Democrat in 2000 among the top 20
newspapers in the United States. At one extreme, the Dallas Morning News is predicted to
endorse the Democrat with just 17 percent probability, re￿ecting the Republican orientation
of local readers. At the other extreme, the New York Times is predicted to endorse the De-
mocrat with 90 percent probability, re￿ecting the left-leaning predispositions among readers
as well as its ownership by the New York Times Company. According to our estimates, the
newspaper among the top 20 with the least bias is the Washington Post, which is predicted
to endorse the Democrat with 54 percent probability.
Before turning to the second-stage estimates, we ￿rst provide graphical evidence regard-
ing the in￿uence of endorsements. To provide a simple test for whether or not endorsements
are in￿uential on average, Figure 2 depicts trends in support for the Democratic candidate
among readers separately for newspapers endorsing the Democrat and for newspapers en-
dorsing the Republican in the two weeks surrounding the endorsement. As shown, for all
newspapers, there does seem to be a slight widening in the gap between readers of Democrat-
endorsing newspapers and readers of Republican-endorsing newspapers after publication of
the endorsement. The e￿ect is relatively small, however, and is somewhat di￿cult to detect.
As evidence regarding the prediction that endorsement in￿uence depends upon its credibility,
6 We de￿ne a group as a company owning more than 10 newspapers. The default category is newspapers
not owned by groups.
11we next split the sample into readers of newspapers with high-credibility endorsements and
readers of newspapers with low-credibility endorsements. As shown in Figure 3, which fo-
cuses on high credibility, or surprising, endorsements, there appears to be an immediate and
signi￿cant e￿ect of the endorsement on reader voting intentions. In Figure 4, by contrast,
which focuses on low-credibility, or unsurprising endorsements, the e￿ect is again small and
di￿cult to visually detect. These results suggest that high credibility endorsements do have
more in￿uence than do low-credibility endorsements, and we turn next to a more formal
econometric examination of this hypothesis.
As shown in column 1 of Table 2B, which presents our second-stage results based upon
our ￿rst-stage estimates of credibility, we ￿nd support for the idea that endorsement cred-
ibility is a key determinant of the in￿uence of the endorsement, as the coe￿cient on our
credibility measure is positive and statistically signi￿cant. Regarding the other controls, we
also ￿nd that voters who are older or black are more likely to vote for Democrats and voters
who complete high school, relative to high school dropouts, who are male, who attend re-
ligious services or consider themselves born-again Christians are more likely to vote for the
Republican.
To provide a sense of the magnitude of this e￿ect of endorsements and endorsement
credibility, the ￿nal column of Table 3 provides our implied estimates of the in￿uence of
endorsements in the top 20 newspapers in the United States during the 2000 campaign. As
shown, the least credible endorsements were for Gore from the New York Times and for Bush
from the Dallas Morning News. According to the logic of our model, the higher probability
of endorsing Gore by the New York Times, for example, can be interpreted as having a lower
standard in terms of information regarding the quality of Gore, relative to Bush. Thus,
these low-credibility endorsements from the New York Times and the Dallas Morning News
convinced less than one percent of their readers to switch their allegiance to the endorsed
candidate. The endorsements with the largest e￿ect, by contrast, came from the Denver
Post and the Chicago Sun Times, both of which had surprising endorsements. According
to our estimates, these endorsements convinced about 3 percent of readers to switch their
allegiance to the endorsed candidate. Interestingly, both of these newspapers switched their
endorsements in 2004, when the Chicago Sun Times endorsed Kerry and the Denver Post
endorsed Bush. This pattern is consistent with our characterization of these endorsements
in 2000 as unusually credible and surprising.
12Table 4 provides estimates of the e￿ect of endorsements across all newspapers. As shown,
according to our estimates, the Democratic vote share among readers would have been about
2.2 percent higher in 2000 and 1.7 percent higher in 2004 had all newspapers endorsed the
Democrat. If all newspapers had endorsed Bush in 2000 and 2004, by contrast, the Demo-
cratic vote share among newspaper readers would have been 2.6 percent lower in 2000 and
3.1 percent lower in 2004; again these numbers are slightly lower for vote shares among all
voters. Taken together, the di￿erence between all Republican and all Democratic endorse-
ments is almost 5 percent among newspaper readers in both 2000 and 2004. Given that
three-quarters of the sample reports reading a newspaper, this suggests that the net e￿ect
on all voters would have been about 4 percent in both 2000 and 2004 under the assumption
that non-readers were una￿ected.7
One limitation of the baseline results in column 1 of Table 2B is that they combine both
the e￿ects of endorsements and the credibility of endorsements into a single coe￿cient. One
could interpret the credibility measures as econometric weights, where the estimator places
more weight on high credibility endorsements and less weight on low credibility endorse-
ments. Given this interpretation, we next estimate an unweighted model as a ￿rst attempt
to separate these two e￿ects. In this model, we implicitly assume that voters do not ￿lter out
bias, and, in this case, newspaper editorial positions do not matter, and every endorsement
has the same credibility and thus the same in￿uence. In particular, we estimate a linear
probability model in which we include only the endorsement dummy variable (en):
Pr(vote D) = ￿Afternt(2en ￿ 1) ￿ ￿Xv ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿n (14)
As shown in column 2 of Table 2B, the coe￿cient is small and statistically insigni￿cant,
suggesting that only high credibility endorsements have in￿uence and that, on average, en-
dorsements have only a small e￿ect.
To explore this issue further, we also estimate a speci￿cation in which we separately
control for the credibility of the endorsement and a simple endorsement dummy:
7 These percentages are somewhat higher than other estimatates of newspaper readership. In a survey
conducted by Pew Research Center, 65% of respondents said that they read newspapers. According the
circulation data published in Editor and Publisher Year Book, the circulation rate is around 20% in the
United States. This ￿gure is not directly comparable to our survey data, however, given that there are three
people per household on average, and a newspaper may be read by more than one member of the household.
13Pr(vote D) = ￿Afternt[en￿d(pn)￿(1￿en)￿r(pn)]+￿Afternt(2en ￿1)]￿￿Xv ￿￿t ￿￿n (15)
If ￿ltering is complete, as is assumed in our baseline speci￿cation, then the credibility-
weighted measure should have all of the explanatory power and ￿ = ￿ and ￿ = 0: If voters
do not ￿lter, by contrast, then the credibility measure should have no e￿ect (￿ = 0) and
the e￿ect of the endorsement, which is common across newspapers, is summarized by the
coe￿cient on the simple endorsement dummy (￿ > 0):
Whether or not voters ￿lter out bias has important implications for whether or not the
media can systematically in￿uence voters and favor one party over another. To see this,
de￿ne the ex-post in￿uence of the endorsement as follows:
￿ = Pr(vote DjAfter = 1)￿Pr(vote DjAfter = 0) = ￿[en￿d(pn)￿(1￿en)￿r(pn)]+￿(2en￿1)
(16)
The ex-ante in￿uence, before the endorsement decision is made, is then de￿ned naturally by
E(￿). Given the de￿nitions of the Mills ratio and the fact that Pr(en = 1)￿d(pn) =Pr(en =
0)￿r(pn) = ￿(pn), the ￿rst term vanishes when taking expectations, and we have that:
E(￿) = 2￿[Pr(en = 1) ￿ 0:5] (17)
Thus, in the absence of ￿ltering ￿ > 0, biased media outlets have systematic in￿uence, and
the Democratic candidate is advantaged if the outlet is biased to the left (Pr(en = 1) > 0:5)
and likewise for the Republican candidate if the outlet is biased to the right (Pr(en = 1) <
0:5). With complete ￿ltering, by contrast, ￿ = 0, and the media cannot have systematic
in￿uence due to the sophistication on the part of voters.
As shown in column 3 of Table 2B, our results support the notion of complete ￿lter-
ing, relative to no ￿ltering, as the coe￿cient on the simple endorsement dummy variable is
now negative and statistically insigni￿cant. The coe￿cient on the credibility measure, by
contrast, is positive, larger in magnitude than that in column 1, and is highly statistically
signi￿cant. Taken together, these results support the view of complete ￿ltering over that of
no ￿ltering and suggest that voters are su￿ciently sophisticated such that any media bias
cannot systematically bene￿t one party over another.
145.3 Alternative Explanations
In Tables 5 and 6, we explore three alternative explanations for our results. The ￿rst alterna-
tive explanation involves di￿erential trends among readers of di￿erent types of newspapers.
For example, if Republican readers become more likely to support the Republican candidate
during the campaign and Democratic readers become more likely to support the Democratic
candidate, then, under the assumption that newspapers with Republican readers tend to
endorse Republican candidates, we would expect more readers to move towards the endorsed
candidate after the endorsement even if the endorsement has no in￿uence at all. While our
baseline model includes day ￿xed e￿ects, which account for national trends, we have no con-
trols for local trends. We address this issue in two ways. First, in column 1 of Table 5, we
present results that include newspaper-speci￿c trends. This adds a large number of addi-
tional parameters to be estimated, and, as shown, the key coe￿cient is now only signi￿cant
at the 90-percent level. In the second column, we allow for di￿erent trends by voter ideology,
which we measure using self-reported ideology. In particular, we allow for separate trends
for each of ￿ve ideology categories: very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, very
liberal. As shown, the results are similar to those in the baseline speci￿cation.
A second alternative explanation for our baseline result involves di￿erential responsiveness
of readers of di￿erent newspapers. For example, a liberal newspaper may tend to have
mostly very liberal readers and thus very few readers who would switch from supporting
the Republican to supporting the Democrat following an endorsement for the Democrat.
On the other hand, more moderate newspapers may have a large fraction of undecided
readers who could be in￿uenced by an endorsement for the Democrat. Then, we would
expect an endorsement for the Democrat by the moderate newspaper to have more in￿uence
than a similar endorsement by the liberal newspaper even if voters do not ￿lter out media
bias. To address this issue, we next use the voter ideology measures described above to
compare responses to endorsements by similar pools of voters who happen to read di￿erent
newspapers. In particular, in column 3 of Table 5, we exclude those readers least likely to
be in￿uenced by an endorsement, very liberal and very conservative voters, and ￿nd that
the result is similar to the baseline. Next, in column 4, we focus exclusively on moderate
readers, which is less than half of the sample. As shown, the e￿ect is much stronger here
than the baseline result and remains signi￿cant at the 95-percent level.
A third alternative explanation involves the timing of endorsements. For example, sup-
15pose that a candidate visits a city on a campaign stop and that this visit attracts both voters
and the endorsement from the local newspaper shortly after the visit. In this case, we would
expect to see support for the endorsed candidate rise after the endorsement even if the en-
dorsement itself has no in￿uence. To address this issue, we examine the timing of newspaper
endorsements. In particular, Table 6 provides the endorsement dates in both 2000 and 2004
for 69 newspapers in our sample that endorsed on one of the three Sundays preceding the
election in both 2000 and 2004. If newspapers tend to endorse on the same day across election
cycles, then it seems unlikely that the endorsements re￿ect high frequency events occurring
in the city. As shown, there does seem to be some persistence, with about 45 percent of
newspapers endorsing on the same date in both 2000 and 2004. Interestingly, the bulk of
the exceptions, roughly 30 percent of the observations, involved newspapers that endorsed
two Sundays before the election in 2000 but three Sundays before the election in 2004. This
trend towards slightly earlier endorsements likely re￿ects the shift towards early voting in
2004 (Strupp, 2004). Indeed, about one-quarter of these newspapers are located in Florida,
which introduced early voting in 2004. We ￿nd only a few cases with dramatic di￿erences
in the timing of endorsements, such as one newspaper endorsing three Sundays before the
election in 2004 and one Sunday before the election in 2000. Although we cannot completely
rule out this third alternative explanation for our results, these ￿ndings do suggest that the
timing of endorsements follow relatively regular patterns.
5.4 Alternative credibility measures
In this section, we provide results from alternatively credibility measures. Column 1 of Table
7 provides results from an alternative measure based upon the surprise of the endorsement.
This speci￿cation, which does not rely on the underlying assumptions regarding candidate
quality, is given as follows:
Pr(vote D) = ￿Afternt[en￿(￿Zn) ￿ (1 ￿ en)(1 ￿ ￿(￿Zn))] ￿ ￿Xv ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿n (18)
Recalling that the probability of an endorsement for the Republican is given by ￿(￿Zn);
this measure captures the notion that the larger this probability, the greater the degree of
in￿uence for a Democratic endorsement. Likewise, the in￿uence of an endorsement for the
Republican should be increasing in the probability of an endorsement for the Democrat,
16which is given by (1 ￿ ￿(￿Zn)): As shown, the coe￿cient on this alternative credibility
measure has the expected positive sign and remains statistically signi￿cant.
Column 2 uses a measure of credibility based upon the historical endorsement patterns
of newspapers. Note that with a su￿ciently long panel of newspaper endorsements, one
can approximate the probability that newspaper n endorses the Democrat (1 ￿ ￿(pn)) by
the frequency with which the newspaper actually endorses the Democrat (fn): Inverting this
probability, we can then uncover the newspaper’s editorial position as follows:
pn = ￿￿1(1 ￿ fn) (19)
Finally, this measure of editorial position can be plugged into the credibility measures ￿d(pn)
and ￿r(pn): To implement this idea, we use historical endorsement data from Editor and
Publisher as provided by Kim (2008). These data include endorsements in the 10 Presidential
elections between 1960 and 1996. Note that the response rate to the Editor and Publisher
survey is relatively low, and the median newspaper has endorsement information for only
5 out of the 10 elections. For the 2000 endorsements, we calculate fn as the fraction of
endorsements for the Democrat between 1960 and 1996, and, for the 2004 endorsements, we
calculate fn as the fraction of endorsements for the Democrat between 1960 and 2000. For
newspapers that exclusively endorse one party in the historical data (fn = 0 or fn = 1), we
cannot calculate editorial positions as outlined above, and we thus exclude these cases from
the analysis. As shown in column 2, the coe￿cient is quite similar to that in the baseline
speci￿cation and remains signi￿cant at the 90-percent level. Given the incomplete response
rate, we focus in column 3 on the set of newspapers with a relatively complete history, those
with more than 5 endorsements in the Editor and Publisher data, and, as shown, the results
are stronger and the key coe￿cient is statistically signi￿cant at the 95-percent level.
5.5 Additional Robustness Checks
Table 8 provides a series of additional robustness checks of the baseline results. Column 1
presents the results of the speci￿cation without the constraint that the e￿ects of Democratic
endorsements have equal and opposite signs to those of Republican endorsements. The
results demonstrate that the e￿ect of Democratic endorsements has the expected positive
sign, while the e￿ect of Republican endorsements has the expected negative sign. While
neither is statistically di￿erent from zero, they are statistically di￿erent from one another at
17conventional levels. In column 2, we allow the key coe￿cients to vary across the 2000 and
2004 elections. While both coe￿cients have the expected positive sign, only the coe￿cient
on the 2004 credibility measure is statistically di￿erent from zero. This could re￿ect the
fact that Bush was an incumbent in 2004, and newspapers may have thus obtained better
information regarding his quality.
Column 3 uses an alternative measure of readers preferences in the ￿rst stage, that of
potential, rather than actual readers. In particular, we use the fraction of residents in the
newspaper’s market that support the Democrat prior to the endorsement. On the one hand,
this seems a more natural measure since newspapers may set editorial positions in order to
maximize readership. On the other hand, in cities with su￿cient scale to support multiple
newspapers, the market is often segmented into left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers,
as is the case in Washington DC, where left-leaning readers choose the Washington Post and
right-leaning readers choose the Washington Times. It is also possible that some voters are
natural newspaper readers and others are not, and the newspaper may attempt to maximize
the surplus of readers in order to charge a higher price or to include additional advertising
material. Thus, in some cases, the preferences of readers may be a more natural proxy
for editorial positions. In any event, we provide this measure of preferences of residents as
an alternative measure of voter preferences. In the ￿rst stage, which is not reported here,
the market-level preference measure remains positive and statistically signi￿cant. In the
second stage, the coe￿cient on endorsement credibility remains positive but is statistically
insigni￿cant.
The ￿nal robustness check uses information on readership intensity. In the data, readers
were asked how many days per week they read the newspaper. It seems reasonable to assume
that those voters reporting to have read the newspaper seven days per week, which is roughly
half of the sample of newspaper readers, are more likely to be exposed to the endorsement,
relative to low-intensity readers, de￿ned as those reading less than seven days per week.
As shown in column 4, which restricts the sample to those reading seven days per week,
the coe￿cient is larger than in the baseline results and remains statistically signi￿cant at
the 90 percent level. Taken together, the robustness checks reported here tend to support
the baseline results and provide further evidence that readers are responsive to credible
endorsements.
186 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the in￿uence of newspaper endorsements on voting pat-
terns in the 2000 and 2004 U.S. Presidential elections. We ￿rst develop a simple econometric
model in which voters are uncertain over candidate quality and turn to newspaper endorse-
ments for information about the candidates. Newspapers, however, are potentially biased in
favor of one of the candidates and voters thus rationally account for the credibility of any en-
dorsements. Our primary ￿nding is that endorsements are in￿uential in the sense that voters
are more likely to support the recommended candidate after publication of the endorsement.
The degree of this in￿uence, however, depends upon the credibility of the endorsement. In
this way, endorsements for the Democratic candidate from left-leaning newspapers are less
in￿uential than are endorsements from neutral or right-leaning newspapers and likewise for
endorsements for the Republican candidate. These results suggest that voters are sophisti-
cated and attempt to ￿lter out any bias in media coverage of politics.
197 Appendix: Endogenous Editorial Positions
We have considered two theoretical models with endogenous editorial positions. The ￿rst
model follows a literature on demand-side bias. Newspapers are assumed to be pro￿t-
maximizing ￿rms and attempt to maximize the value of information to a representative
consumer with ideology iv: Among other interpretations, this objective could re￿ect a desire
to charge a maximal price or to bundle the maximum amount of advertising. Finally, we
assume that newspapers can commit to an editorial position. Without loss of generality,
consider a left-leaning voter [iv > (iR + iD)=2]. The value of information in this case (V ) is
the possibility of an endorsement for R:











The ￿rst term is negative and represents the cost of voting against one’s prior. The second
term represents the value of information. In this case, it is straightforward to show that the
editorial position that maximizes the value of information to the representative consumer is










This result is similar to that in Suen (2004), who examines similar issues in the context of a
binary quality measure.
The second model follows a literature on supply-side bias. Newspaper owners are citizens
with ideological preferences (in) and wish to manipulate voting decisions of a representative
voter. We look for an informative equilibrium in which the newspaper endorses according
owner preferences, and the voter chooses to follow the endorsement even if it requires voting
against his prior. In this case, the newspaper prefers the Democrat after receiving the signal
if:











￿ ￿n under Bayesian updating, we have that the editorial









20In order for this to be an informative equilibrium, the representative voter must follow the
endorsement even if it goes against his prior. This requires that the newspaper’s information
is of su￿ciently high quality and that the preferences of the reader and owner are su￿ciently
aligned.
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24Figure 1: Dates of Newspaper Endorsements in 2000 and 2004 
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Figure 4: Low-Credibility Endorsements and Voting
                                                 Table 1 Summary Statistics 
                 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min Max
Intend to vote for Democratic Candidate 
 
32,014 0.544  0.498  0 1
Have a high school degree, no college 
 
32,014 0.217  0.412  0 1
Have some college or higher 
 
32,014 0.741  0.438  0 1
Male 
 
32,014 0.473  0.499  0 1
Black 
 
32,014 0.093  0.291  0 1
Age 
 
32,014 47.225  15.973  18 97
Born-again Christian 
 
32,014 0.312  0.463  0 1
Attend religious services 
 
32,014  0.388 0.487 0 1
Read newspaper with democratic endorsement 
 
32,014 0.593  0.491  0 1
          
 
       
                                  Table 2A: First Stage -- Newspaper Ideology 
 
             Dependent Variable: Endorse Democratic Candidate  
Readers Preference    4.073*** 
 (0.673) 
Group owner effect 
a   
     Advance Publications Inc.  0.269 
 (0.280) 
     Cox Newspapers  1.096** 
 (0.422) 
     E W Scripps Co.  -0.164 
 (0.526) 
     Gannett Co. Inc  0.910*** 
 (0.238) 
     Hearst Newspapers  0.463 
 (0.334) 
     Knight Ridder  1.043*** 
 (0.324) 
     Lee Enterprises Inc.  -0.135 
 (0.470) 
     McClatchy Newspapers  1.634*** 
 (0.381) 
     New York Times Co.  0.870** 
 (0.395) 




Observations: 378    Sample: Newspapers made endorsements in 2000 or 2004
 b 
              Standard errors in parentheses; * denotes 90% significance; ** denotes 95% significance;  
               *** denotes 99% significance. 
         
a Default Category: Newspapers not owned by group owners. Companies own more than 10 
         newspapers in the sample are defined as group owner of newspapers. 
                












Table 2B: Second Stage: Effect of Newspaper Endorsements on Vote Intention 
 
                     Dependent Variable:  1 if intend to vote for the Democrat 
       I      II      III 
Credibility 0.029**    0.055** 
 (0.013)    (0.026) 
Endorsement     0.011  -0.020 
   (0.008)  (0.017) 
High school  -0.047***  -0.047***  -0.047*** 
 (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
College -0.013  -0.013  -0.013 
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Male -0.088***  -0.087***  -0.088*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Black 0.440***  0.440***  0.440*** 
 (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Age 0.002**  0.002**  0.002** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Age squared  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Born again Christian  -0.150***  -0.150***  -0.150*** 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Attend religious activities -0.123***  -0.123***  -0.123*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Constant 0.740***  0.740***  0.741*** 
 (0.183)  (0.189)  (0.183) 
Income categories  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Newspaper fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Date fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 32014  32014  32014 
           Standard errors in parentheses; * denotes 90% significance; ** denotes 95% significance;  
            *** denotes 99% significance. 
  
 
Table 3: Influence of Top 20 Newspapers in 2000
a 













New York Times  75%    New York Times  90%  Gore  0.50% 
Washington  Post  64%       --  54%  Gore  2.10% 
New  York  Daily  News  67%       --  58%  Gore  1.90% 
Chicago  Tribune  53%       --  36%  Bush  -1.70% 
Newsday  57%       --  44%  Gore  2.60% 
Houston Chronicle  39%    Hearst  34%  Bush  -1.60% 
Dallas  Morning  News  35%       --  17%  Bush  0.90% 
Chicago  Sun  Times  67%       --  58%  Bush  -2.70% 
Boston Globe  72%    New York Times  89%  Gore  0.50% 
San Francisco Chronicle  74%    Hearst  82%  Gore  0.90% 
Arizona  Republic   41%       --  20%  Bush  -1.00% 
New  York  Post  49%       --  31%  Bush  -1.50% 
Rocky  Mountain  News  47%       --  28%  Bush  -1.30% 
Denver  Post  52%       --  35%  Gore  3.10% 
Philadelphia Inquirer  59%   Knight  Ridder  82%  Gore  0.90% 
Union-Tribune  51%       --  34%  Bush  -1.60% 
a USA Today, Wall Street Journal and LA Times are not in this table because those newspapers did not make 
an endorsement or made a non-endorsement in 2000. 
 
b Missing (--) means that the newspaper is not owned by a group owner. Group owner is defined as a 
company that owns more than ten daily newspapers in the survey. 
 Table 4: Counterfactual Endorsement Scenarios 
 
   Year 2000  Year 2004
Vote share of the Democratic candidate in sample    53.25%   55.41% 
    
Predicted change in Democratic vote share among 
readers if all newspapers made Democratic 
endorsements 
 






Predicted change in Democratic vote share among 
readers  if all newspapers made Republican 
endorsements 
 
  -2.62% 
 
 
  -3.12% 
 
 
Net effect among readers 
 




    
Predicted change in Democratic vote share among 









Predicted change in Democratic vote share among 
voters if all newspapers made Republican 
endorsements 
 
   -1.96  % 
 
 
  -2.34% 
 
 
Net effect among voters 
 
  +3.60% 
 
  +3.64% 
 
    
 Table 5: Alternative Explanations 
 
Dependent Variable:  1 if intend to vote for the Democrat 
 
     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 
After*Credibility  0.023* 0.024**  0.028**  0.051** 
  (0.014) (0.011)  (0.013) (0.022) 
Newspaper-specific trends  Yes      
Ideology-specific trends   Yes    





Paper fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Date fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  32014  32014  27905      12601 
             Other control variables are included. Standard errors in parentheses; * denotes 90% significance; 
** denotes 95% significance; *** denotes 99% significance. Table 6: Timing of Endorsements 
 
 
  10/17/2004 10/24/2004 10/31/20004  Total 
10/22/2000 13.04%  10.14%  1.45%  24.63% 
10/29/2000 30.43%  30.43%  7.25%  68.11% 
11/5/2000 1.45%  4.35%  1.45% 7.25% 
Total 44.92%  44.92%  10.15%  100% 
 
Notes: Based upon a sample of 69 newspapers that made endorsements on the three 
Sundays prior to the election in both 2000 and 2004. 11/5/2000 is the Sunday before the 
2000 election, and 10/31/2004 is the Sunday before the 2004 election. Table 7: Alternative Credibility Measures 
 
Dependent Variable:  1 if intend to vote for the Democrat 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
After*Surprise measure     0.047**     
     (0.021)     
After*Historical measure        0.027*     0.051** 
       (0.017)     (0.024) 
Sample all  Papers with sufficient 
endorsement history 
a 
Papers with more than 5 
historical endorsements
Paper fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes 
Date fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations  32014  14574  6457    
              
a Historical credibility measure is derived from the probability of endorsing the democrat/republican 
candidates, which is calculated as the fraction of democratic/republican endorsements from historical 
record. The credibility measure is not well-defined when this fraction is either 1 or 0, and newspapers that 
always supported the same political party are excluded from this specification. 
             Other control variables are included. Standard errors in parentheses; * denotes 90% significance; ** 
denotes 95% significance; *** denotes 99% significance. Table 8: Additional robustness checks 
 
Dependent Variable:  1 if intend to vote for the Democrat 
 
     I     II     III     IV 
After*Credibility    0.020  0.036* 
    (0.012)  (0.021) 
After*Credibility-Dem  0.026     
  (0.024)     
After*Credibility-Rep  -0.033     
  (0.023)     
After*Credibility-2000   0.015    
   (0.017)    
After*Credibility-2004   0.047    
   (0.019)**    
First-stage preference  reader reader market  reader 
Voter sample  all   all  all  only 7-day 
readers 
Paper fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Date fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  32014  32014  32014      15573 
             Other control variables are included. Standard errors in parentheses; * denotes 90% significance; 
** denotes 95% significance; *** denotes 99% significance. 